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NOTES
WAKE UP AND SMELL THE CONTRABAND: WHY COURTS
THAT DO NOT FIND PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON ODOR
ALONE ARE WRONG1
It was around midnight on' March 9, 1994, when Officer
Walendzik of the Wyoming, Michigan police department drove
through the parking lot of a known high-crime area as part of his
routine patrol.2 Officer Walendzik observed a car with five male
occupants in the parking lot.' After noticing that the car was not
running and that the occupants were not attempting to exit the car,
Officer Walendzik approached and spoke to the individual in the
driver's seat.4
When the driver rolled down his window, Officer Walendzik
immediately detected the odor of burned marijuana.5 Although
Officer Walendzik was familiar with the smell based on his prior
experience arresting marijuana offenders,6 he called a fellow officer
to the scene to confirm his detection of the odor before searching
the car.7 The second officer confirmed the odor of marijuana
1. This Note stems from a case the author observed in the General District Court of
Hampton, Virginia, in which odor alone was found insufficient for a finding of probable cause.
The case was a felony preliminary hearing argued onJuly 12,1999, byJames Schliessmann,
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney. The author would like to thank Mr. Schliessmann for
his insights on this topic before and in the early stages of the writing process.
2. See People v. Taylor, 564 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Mich. 1997), overruled by People v.
Kazmierczak, 605 N.W.2d 667 (Mich. 2000).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. Officer Walendzik described the odor as the "strong pungent odor' of
marijuana." Id. at 31 (Weaver, J., dissenting).
6. See id at 26.
7. See id.
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immediately upon approaching the passenger's side of the vehicle.'
He recognized the odor from his previous contact with marijuana
during two years of police experience.9
After the second officer detected the odor, the officers ordered the
occupants out of the car and conducted a pat-down search, which
uncovered a handgun in the possession of a passenger.' ° A
subsequent search of the vehicle uncovered three additional
handguns, three facemasks, pagers, and pieces of a cigar that
appeared to contain marijuana."
At the preliminary hearing, the defense attorney moved to
suppress all of the evidence obtained from the vehicle, arguing that
the search was illegal because it was not supported by probable




11. See id. at 26, 31.
12. See id. at 27. The Fourth Amendment requires "probable cause" before conducting
a search. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933).
Although the Amendment refers explicitly to the need for probable cause to obtain awarrant,
there are numerous well-settled exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (indicating that no warrant is needed for items
in "plain view"); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (detailing the automobile
exception, which recognizes the mobility of vehicles as a reason to overlook the warrant
requirement); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (articulating the "open fields"
exception, which provides that items left out in the open, even when on private property, are
not protected by the Fourth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)
(explaining that no warrant is needed for a search incident to arrest); see also Andrew Agati,
Note, The Plain Feel Doctrine of Minnesota v. Dickerson: Creating an Illusion, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 927, 932-36 (1995) (discussing some common exceptions to the warrant
requirement); BrettAndrew Harvey, Comment, Minnesota v. Dickerson and the Plain Touch
Doctrine: A Proposal to Preserve Fourth Amendment Liberties During Investigatory Stops,
58 ALB. L. REV. 871, 875 n.31 (1995) (providing a list of exceptions to the warrant
requirement). The question of whether a warrant is required, however, does not affect the
need to establish probable cause before a search is permissible. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161
(stating that probable cause is required for warrantless searches); id. at 155-56 (indicating
that probable cause is necessary before conducting a search even when the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement is at play); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCHAND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1(a), at 543 (2d ed. 1987) (asserting that a
warrantless search is not permissible without probable cause). The determination of the
existence of probable cause is based on "the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160,175 (1949). Probable cause to search requires proof of "a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The determination ultimately rests on a common sense analysis of
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odor of marijuana by both police officers, the magistrate agreed
with defense counsel and dismissed the case.13 The prosecutor
appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan,14 which affirmed in
People v. Taylor,15 holding that the odor of marijuana by itself is
insufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause.16 As a result, five
young males found by police to have handguns, facemasks, and
illegal contraband in their possession were back on the street,
unpunished.
The anomalous holding in Taylor is not an isolated result.
Although most jurisdictions would disagree with Taylor,17 a
significant number of jurisdictions have either refused to accept a
plain smell corollary to the plain view doctrine, 8 or have given
ambiguous or contradictory rulings on the issue. 9 In jurisdictions
that have failed to adopt plain smell, officers who have sufficient
training or experience to immediately identify certain odors are
placed in a conundrum. They can either 1) let someone go who they
are fairly certain is in possession of contraband, or 2) strive to
uncover an additional piece of evidence to create sufficient probable
cause to justify a search. Each of these options is unsatisfactory.
The former is unsatisfactory because it may allow a large number
the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 230-31.
13. See Taylor, 564 N.W.2d at 27.
14. See id.
15. 564 N.W.2d 24 (Mich. 1997), overruled by People v. Kazmierczak,605 N.W.2d 667
(Mich. 2000). Although the Michigan Supreme Court overruled Taylor while this Note was
in progress, Taylor is representative of the inherently illogical results that occur in
jurisdictions that have failed to adopt the plain smell doctrine.
16. See id. at 30 ("We hold that the smell of marijuana is but one factor to consider...
in determiningwhether probable cause exists to conduct a search ofa parked vehicle without
a warrant.").
17. See Larry E. Holtz, The "Plain Touch" Corollary: A Natural and Foreseeable
Consequence of the Plain View Doctrine, 95 DIcK. L. REv. 521, 533 (1991) ("[A] substantial
majority of the courts across the country that have addressed the issue have routinely
recognized a'plain smell corollary to the plain view doctrine."). The term plain smell, as the
relation to the plain view doctrine suggests, refers to the situation in which an officer makes
his determination of probable cause based solely on his detection of some distinctive odor.
This Note employs the terms "plain smell," "the plain smell doctrine," and "the plain smell
corollary to plain view" interchangeably.
18. For a discussion of two states that have repudiated plain smell, see infra notes 61-66
and accompanying text.
19. Exemplary are Virginia, Georgia, and Ohio. For a discussion of how these
jurisdictions have treated plain smell, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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of criminals to escape arrest, even though they are within the grasp
of a police officer whose level of suspicion exceeds that which is
constitutionally required to conduct a search.2" The latter is un-
satisfactory because there will be many situations in which the
officer is unable to perceive any incriminating factors beyond the
odor that he has already detected. Moreover, this latter option
encourages officers to fabricate additional evidence in order to
consummate the arrest of a subject who they are confident
possesses contraband.2 Judicial recognition of the officer's ability
to identify a distinctive odor based on his training or experience
eliminates the illogical situation where the officer must choose
between two such unsatisfactory options.
This Note provides an overview of the principal arguments
advocating and condemning the adoption of a plain smell corollary
to the plain view doctrine.22 This Note concludes that those juris-
dictions that have yet to definitively resolve the issue should adopt
the plain smell doctrine, and those that have rejected plain smell
should reconsider their position.
The first section of this Note briefly discusses the history of the
plain smell doctrine and how commentators and courts, particularly
the Supreme Court, have treated it. The second section focuses on
the manner in which state courts have treated plain smell. This
section notes that the contradictory application of the plain smell
doctrine in some jurisdictions leaves law enforcement and attorneys
with little certainty as to whether searches based solely on scent
are valid. The section then turns to the divergence among state
court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and discusses why
20. Probable cause is usually required before conducting a search. Under limited
circumstances, however, police may search based on a lesser showing, commonly referred to
as reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968). This Note is limited to
situations requiring a showing of probable cause. For a discussion of what is required to
establish probable cause, see supra note 12.
21. Contributing to the problem is the danger that 'when citizens see obviously guilty
and perhaps dangerous criminals being allowed to go free, there is a temptation to take the
law into their own hands." HAROLDJ. ROTHwAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
62 (1996).
22. This is not a survey of all fifty states and how they have treated plain smell. Rather,
the jurisdictions that are analyzed are meant to be representative of those jurisdictions
whose current situation substantially parallels that of one of the treated jurisdictions.
292 [Vol. 42:289
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such a disparity is problematic. The third section presents the
arguments against the adoption of the plain smell doctrine and
explains why those arguments are unconvincing. The section con-
cludes by analyzing the arguments in favor of plain smell. The
fourth section examines some of the policy and logistical issues that
accompany the adoption of plain smell. Finally, this Note concludes
that the arguments in favor of a plain smell corollary to plain view
greatly outweigh the arguments against plain smell. As such, this
Note encourages those jurisdictions in which the issue is unsettled
to affirmatively adopt the plain smell doctrine.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLAIN SMELL
Although the Supreme Court has accepted the validity of the
plain view doctrine since 1971,23 and has recently adopted a plain
touch corollary to plain view,24 the Court has never explicitly
extended plain view to include the sense of smell. In Taylor v.
United States,25 decided during the Prohibition Era, the Court held
that the detection by officers of the odor of whiskey did not
authorize a warrantless search.26 Taylor, however, involved the
search of part of the defendant's home,27 and therefore should not
be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of plain smell.28
23. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). The plain view doctrine
allows an officer to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. See id.
24. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373-75 (1993). Most state and federal
courts had already recognized a plain feel corollary to plain view at the time Dickerson was
decided. See id. at 371 n.1; Harvey, supra note 12, at 889 & n.131. The terms "plain touch"
and "plain feel" are used interchangeably in this Note.
25. 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
26. See id. at 6.
27. The law enforcement agents smelled the odor ofwhiskey comingfrom the defendant's
garage. See id. at 5.
28. Fourth Amendment protection is contingent upon a showing of a legitimate
expectation of privacy. See Agati, supra note 12, at 931 (citing United States v. Katz, 389
U.S. 347,352 (1967)). The expectation of privacy in buildings, especially the home, is greater
than that in other places, such as vehicles. See Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132, 153
(1925); see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,389 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Freedom from
intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype ofthe privacy protection secured by the
Fourth Amendment.").
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Sixteen years later, in Johnson v. United States,29 the Court
again invalidated a warrantless search based on the officers'
detection of a distinctive odor."0 Like Taylor, however, the place
searched in Johnson was part of a building.3 ' Significantly, the
Court indicated that Taylor did not stand for the proposition that
evidence of odors could never constitute sufficient probable cause
for a search. 2 The Court also stated that:
[i]f the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and
he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one
sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this
Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify
issuance of a search warrant. Indeed it might very well be
found to be evidence of most persuasive character.3
Thus, the Court expressly recognized the validity of considering
distinctive odors in the determination of probable cause for
obtaining a search warrant. Nevertheless, the Court was openly
wary of any search conducted without a warrant.35 At best,
therefore, Johnson was inconclusive on the issue of plain smell.
The most recent Supreme Court case to address plain smell,
United States v. Johns,6 has been cited by some courts and
commentators as an endorsement of the plain smell doctrine."7
29. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
30. See id. at 15. The Court so held even though the officers immediately detected the
"strong odor of burning opium which to them was distinctive and unmistakable." Id. at 12.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 13.
33. Id.
34. If the Supreme Court is willing to concede that odor alone may be enough to obtain
a search warrant, it is difficult to imagine why odor alone could not justify a warrantless
search when an exception to the warrant requirement exists.
35. See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 ("Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers
in making a search without a warrant would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity
and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.").
36. 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
37. See People v. Cruz, 409 N.W.2d 797, 799-800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) ("[The Court [in
United States v. Johns] reasoned that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicles
themselves once they detected the distinct odor of marijuana. Given this probable cause, the
search of the package without a warrant was permissible .... "); State v. Affprung, 854 P.2d
873, 877 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (citing United States v. Johns as recognizing the "plain odor"
294 [Vol. 42:289
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Unfortunately for plain smell proponents, however, such claims are
untenable. Justice O'Connor expressly stated in her majority
opinion that the plain smell issue was not before the Court.38
Moreover, in acknowledging that the officers had probable cause to
search without a warrant, the Court mentioned a series of factors
leading to the finding of probable cause,39 and indicated that it was
a combination of those surrounding circumstances that suggested
that the trucks were involved in smuggling activity.4" The finding
of probable cause in Johns, therefore, is more aptly characterized
as a totality of the circumstances analysis than as an implemen-
tation of the plain smell doctrine. As such, Johns does not represent
Supreme Court approval of plain smell.
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to adopt plain smell, the
lower federal courts embrace it overwhelmingly.4' The Fourth
doctrine); Ned E. Schwartz, Comment, Constitutional Law -FourthAmendment - WhenMay
a Police Officer's Perception of Certain Odors Provide a Sufficient Basis for Searches or
Seizures Without Warrants?, 32 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 137, 148 (1987) ("In United States u.
Johns, the odor of marijuana emanating from trucks justified a search of their contents."
(footnote omitted)). Although the Schwartz Comment also advocates adoption of plain smell,
it focuses narrowly on United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. See id. at 140. This Note,
in contrast, argues that Supreme Court resolution of the plain smell issue is unlikely at this
juncture, and that each jurisdiction in which the issue remains unsettled should therefore
take the initiative to adopt plain smell without waiting for the Supreme Court to do so.
38. See Johns, 469 U.S. at 481 ("The Court of Appeals rejected the Government's
contentions that the plain odor ofmarilj]uana emanating from the packages made a warrant
unnecessary and that respondents .. . lacked standing to challenge the search of the
packages. Neither of these issues is before this Court." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
39. See id. at 480-81 (noting that defendants were already under surveillance for
suspected drug smuggling;, defendants drove trucks to a remote airstrip near the Mexican
border; two small planes landed; defendants' trucks approached the planes and then the
planes left).
40. See id. at 482.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that
officer's detection of the odor of marijuana gave him probable cause to search the entire
vehicle for drugs); United States v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); United
States v. Downs, 151 F.3d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that strong odor of raw
marijuana emanating from defendant's vehicle gave officer probable cause to search trunk);
United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that agent's detection of
the odor of marijuana gave him probable cause to search vehicle); United States v. Pierre,
958 F.2d 1304,1310 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding awarrantless search ofavehicle when border
patrol agents stopped vehicle for routine questioning and smelled freshly burned marijuana);
United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the "odor of
marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage");
United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323,325 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating, "'[pilain view,'we think
it safe to say, encompasses 'plain touch,' and probably 'plain smell' as well"); United States
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:289
Circuit has taken a particularly strong stance on the issue of plain
smell.42 In United States v. Sifuentes for example, the Fourth
Circuit suggested that the detection of the odor of marijuana places
it into "plain view."44 In United States v. Haley,45 that court again
noted that an odor emanating from a container brings the contents
of that container "into plain view,"46 and further stated that "odor
alone is sufficient cause to search" such containers.47 The Haley
Court expressly asserted that an officer's detection of the odor of
marijuana originating from a vehicle creates sufficient probable
cause for a warrantless search.4" Thus, despite a lack of guidance
from the Supreme Court on plain smell, the Fourth Circuit, like the
majority of federal courts, has unambiguously given its imprimatur
to the plain smell doctrine.
The groundwork for the Supreme Court to decisively adopt plain
smell was sufficiently laid over a decade ago, yet the Court has
v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201, 203 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding a warrantless search of garbage bags
containing marijuana based on the smell of marijuana); United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d
1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that odor of marijuana established probable cause for a
search); United States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210, 211 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that informant's
detection of odor of marijuana was sufficient to provide probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant); United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, 398 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing
the validity of finding probable cause based on odor alone); United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d
467, 471 (3d Cir. 1973) (validating a search of a suitcase based solely on officer's detection
of the odor of marijuana); United States v. Leazar, 460 F.2d 982,984 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding
that police officer's detection of marijuana odor in car created probable cause for arrest); see
also Holtz, supra note 17, at 533 & n.73 (stating that the majority ofcourts addressing plain
smell have adopted it, and providing a list of such courts). But see United States v. Dien, 609
F.2d 1038, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusing to apply plain smell doctrine to odor of marijuana
emanating from cardboard boxes in defendant's van). Neither the Seventh nor the Eleventh
Circuit have ruled directly on plain smell.
42. See United States v. Norman, 701 F.2d 295, 297 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that for an
object to be in plain view, it must be "obvious to the senses," and "[tlo be obvious to the
senses, [an item] need only reveal itself in a characteristic way to one of the senses"
(emphasis added)); Haley, 669 F.2d at 203 (upholding a warrantless search of garbage bags
based on the smell of marijuana); United States v. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.
1974) (holding that officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle
when he smelled marijuana).
43. 504 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1974).
44. See id. at 848.
45. 669 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1982).
46. Id. at 203.
47. Id. at 204 n.3.
48. See id. at 203 (citing United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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continually failed to do so.49 In fact, the last time the plain smell
issue was involved in a Supreme Court opinion, the Court made it
clear that it was not settling the question.5" Thus, despite the
virtually unanimous acceptance of plain smell among the federal
circuits, state courts are free to decide the issue on their own. As a
result, two problems have arisen. First, the interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment by some states' highest courts directly conflicts
with the federal courts' interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, in states in which the highest court has yet to address the
issue, the lower courts are left with no mandatory authority from
which to draw guidance. The result of the second problem is an ad
hoc determination of probable cause each time a plain smell case
arises, allowing for lack of uniformity within the same state.
Supreme Court adoption of plain smell would remedy both
problems. With no serious split among the federal circuits, however,
waiting for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue may not be the
wisest solution.
THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM WITH LEAVING THE ISSUE UNSETTLED
It is axiomatic that the law should be administered uniformly
within the same jurisdiction. This concept applies to both the
application of state law within a single state, as well as the
application of federal law across all fifty states. Obvious concerns
over fairness, certainty, and stability in the law arise when there is
variance in the interpretation of a specific law5 within the same
jurisdiction.52 Despite the indisputable logic behind consistency in
law enforcement, there is a current lack of uniformity in the United
49. See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 140. Schwartz based his argument largely on the fact
that Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects substantial confidence in the role of odor as a
factor leading to a determination of probable cause. See id. at 147-48, 157, 159.
50. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
51. This reasoning applies equally whether the law in question is a statute, a
constitutional provision, or common law.
52. See Laurie R. Wallach, Note, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of
ExtracircuitJudgments, 95 YALEL.J. 1500,1506 (1986) (recognizingthatsubjectingdifferent
people in a single jurisdiction to different sets of laws "raises the specter of inequitable
treatment").
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States with regard to the application of the plain smell doctrine.'
This lack of uniformity results in confusion among the lower courts,
police officers, attorneys, and citizens of those jurisdictions as to
whether an officer's olfactory detection of the odor of marijuana 4 is
sufficient in itself to create probable cause for a search.
Lack of Uniformity Within States
Through their rulings at the intermediate appellate level, several
states have failed to articulate a clear position on the issue of plain
smell.55 One state appears to be so confused with regard to plain
smell that its appellate courts have oscillated on the issue on an
53. This lack of uniformity can be seen within individual states that have given
contradictory rulings on plain smell, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text, as well as
across state borders, with states differing over whether the Fourth Amendment authorizes
the adoption of the plain smell doctrine, see infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
54. The plain smell doctrine is not limited to the detection of the smell of marijuana. See,
e.g., Pong Ying v. United States, 66 F.2d 67, 67-68 (3d Cir. 1933) (holding that narcotics
officer's detection of the odor of burning opium justified a warrantless search); State v.
Schubert, 561 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J. Super. 1989) (holding that the strong odor of gasoline
emanating from car of arson suspect created probable cause to search the vehicle). The vast
majority of plain smell cases, however, involve the odor of marijuana. As such, this Note
speaks primarily about police officers' detection of the odor of marijuana, but its thesis is not
so limited in scope.
55. Virginia and Georgia are exemplary. In Virginia, the Court of Appeals has hinted at
an acceptance of plain smell, but has never clearly adopted the doctrine. See Commonwealth
v. Jones, 1997 WL 557005, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1997) (appearing to find probable
cause based on odor alone, but not clearly excluding other factors from the holding); Lewis
v. Commonwealth, 1997 WL 260581, at *1-2 (Va. Ct. App. May 20, 1997) (suggesting, but not
expressly stating, that the odor of marijuana alone gave officer probable cause to search
vehicle). The situation in Georgia is substantially similar to that in Virginia. Compare
Brewer v. State, 199 S.E.2d 109, 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that odor of marijuana is
not in itself sufficient evidence to establish probable cause), overruled by State v. Folk, 521
S.E.2d 194, 198 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), and Albert v. State, 511 S.E.2d 244, 248 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999) (recognizing that the issue of plain smell was still unresolved in Georgia, and holding
that odor of marijuana was only one factor in the determination of probable cause), with
Rogers v. State, 205 S.E.2d 901, 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (recanting prior statement from
Brewer that odor alone cannot establish probable cause), and State v. Folk, 521 S.E.2d 194,
198 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) ("We now hold that a trained police officer's perception of the odor
of burning marijuana... constitutes sufficient probable cause to support the warrantless
search of a vehicle."). Although Folk appears to settle the issue of plain smell in Georgia, it
remains to be seen whether the Georgia Supreme Court will ratify that decision if given the
opportunity to rule on plain smell.
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almost yearly basis.56 The fact that the intermediate appellate
courts in these jurisdictions have given contradictory rulings on
plain smell, coupled with these states' highest courts' failure to
decide the issue, leaves the lower courts free to accept or reject
plain smell on an ad hoc basis." With a plain smell case before it,
therefore, a court in one of these jurisdictions may simply choose
to follow the precedent that most conveniently matches its own
personal views.5 8 The inevitable result is a disturbing lack of
uniformity in the administration of the law within the same
jurisdiction.59 Such lack of uniformity wears the badge of arbi-
56. Ohio has been extraordinarily indecisive on the plain smell issue. Compare State v.
Jones, 1998 WL 515939, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1998) (holding that "suspicious odors
must be confirmed by tangible evidence in order to justify a search"), and State v. Fisher,
1997 WL 799912, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1997) (holding that odor of marijuana could
lead to a finding of probable cause only in conjunction with other factors), and State v.
Haynes, 1996 WL 649167, at*5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 19,1996) (holdingthat odor ofmarijuana
plus "additional articulable facts, is sufficient to establish probable cause"), and State v.
Younts, 637 N.E.2d 64, 67-69 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that odor of marijuana alone did
not provide officer with probable cause to search vehicle) with State v. Moore, 1999 WL
770216, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1999) (holding that detection of odor of marijuana by
trained police officer is sufficient probable cause to search avehicle), and State v. Woods, 680
N.E.2d 729, 731 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) ("The plain view and plain smell doctrines have both
been accepted by the courts of this state... . "), and State v. Garcia, 513 N.E.2d 1350, 1352
(Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the smell of marijuana by itself could provide probable
cause for a warrantless search).
57. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Poe, (Va. Gen. Dist. Ct., July 12,1999) (notes on file with
the author) (ruling that smell alone of marijuana did not support a findingofprobable cause);
Commonwealth v. Braun, 1992 WL 884994, at *1-2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 1992) (holding
search illegal after failing to consider the fact that the officer had detected the odor of
marijuana before extending the scope of a Terry search to the defendant's pocket knife and
vehicle). Although such rulings appear contrary to the spirit of rulings by the Virginia Court
of Appeals, see supra note 55, they will continue to be possible until the Virginia Court of
Appeals, or preferably the Virginia Supreme Court, takes a firm stance on plain smell.
58. Compare Moore, 1999 WL 770216, at *4 (citing an Ohio case from 1986 as support for
its holding that plain smell is enough for probable cause), with Haynes, 1996 WL 649167, at
*5 (adhering to two 1995 Ohio cases in holding that odor is only one factor in finding of
probable cause).
59. In such jurisdictions, those who rely on the law as guidance for their daily
responsibilities are consistently forced onto shaky ground when dealing with a plain smell
situation. Police officers are left with uncertainty and frustration when faced with the
prospect of making a probable cause determination in the field. With no way to be certain
whether a court will uphold a determination of probable cause based on plain smell, the
officer is forced to release suspects even when he is relatively certain they possess
contraband, or risk conducting a search that a court will later find illegal. Given the nature
of the profession, it is not an earth-shattering assertion to say that it is preferable to provide
police officers with as much certainty as possible in the performance of their duties. See
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trariness, thus engendering distrust and confusion among citizens
with regard to the criminal justice system."0 Consistency in
decisionmaking, conversely, engenders the respect and deference
that our justice system should command.
Inconsistency Across State Lines
In addition to the contradictory rulings on plain smell that exist
within certain states, there is a lack of uniformity on the plain
smell issue across state borders. Although the majority of juris-
dictions addressing the issue have adopted the plain smell
doctrine,6 ' Michigan and Montana have expressly rejected it. 2
Consequently, one may gain or lose a certain amount of Fourth
Amendment protection simply by traveling from one state to
ROTHWAX, supra note 21, at 60 ("[Elvery day of the week, cops have to make quick decisions
under highly stressful circumstances, burdened by the fogginess of the law.").
With such uncertainty in the courts, both prosecutors and defense attorneys will be on
unsteady ground when they pursue a plea bargain in a plain smell case. On the one hand,
prosecutors will be pressured to strike a bargain rather than risk seeing the defendant go
unpunished. As a result, dangerous criminals will sometimes be put back on the street much
sooner than they would have been had the case gone to trial. On the other hand, defense
attorneys will be pressured to accept a deal rather than risk the tougher sentence for their
client that would result from a conviction. As a result, defendants who could have walked
away with a dismissal will now have a criminal record.
60. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981) ("When a person cannot
know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person
cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope
of his authority."); see also Wallach, supra note 52, at 1511 (noting a correlation between a
lack of uniformity in the application of the law and diminishing faith in the judicial system).
61. See Holtz, supra note 17, at 533; see, e.g., State v. Harrison, 533 P.2d 1143, 1144
(Ariz. 1975); People v. Gregg, 117 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1974); Porter v. State, 302 So. 2d 481,
482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Sandoval, 590 P.2d 175, 177 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979);
State v. Wallace, 563 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Or. Ct. App., 1977); Commonwealth v. Stoner, 344
A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975); Luera v. State, 561 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tex. Crim. App.
1978); State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing the validity of the
plain smell doctrine with regard to searches of vehicles).
62. See People v. Taylor, 564 N.W.2d 24, 30 (Mich. 1997), overruled by People v.
Kazmierczak, 605 N.W.2d 667 (Mich. 2000); People v. Hilber, 269 N.W.2d 159, 161-63 (Mich.
1978); State v. Olson, 589 P.2d 663, 665 (Mont. 1979); State v. Schoendaller, 578 P.2d 730,
734 (Mont. 1978). This Note was substantially in progress at the time Taylor was overruled.
The fact that the Michigan Supreme Court has now adopted the plain smell doctrine serves
to bolster this Note's ultimate thesis. See infra note 143. By recognizing that plain smell is
a viable doctrine, Michigan has implicitly acknowledged that the arguments in favor of plain
smell outweigh the arguments in opposition.
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another. From a purely legal standpoint, such discrepancies would
not be troubling if they were based on a distinction between the
state constitutions and the Fourth Amendment." Both Michigan
and Montana, however, made it clear-that their decisions to reject
plain smell were based on their interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, not on some broader
provision of their own constitutions." The problem, therefore, lies
in the lack of uniformity among states in interpreting the same
provision of the Federal Constitution.65 Such a divergence of
interpretation is contrary to the constitutional mandate that all
people are to receive the "equal protection of the laws."66
THE PROS AND CONS OF PLAIN SMELL
The Case Against Plain Smell
The Supreme Court accepted the validity of the plain view
doctrine in 1971,7 and recently adopted a plain touch corollary to
plain view.6" The sense of smell, however, has been criticized as
being less reliable than the senses of sight and touch.6 9 The
63. States are free to shape their own constitutions to provide more protection to their
citizens from governmental intrusions than the Federal Constitution provides. See City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283,293 (1982); Kevin John Licciardi, Criminal
Procedure: Search and Seizure, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 1308, 1308 (1998).
64. See Taylor, 564 N.W.2d at 28 n.4; Schoendaller, 578 P.2d at 733. With regard to the
determination of probable cause, state courts generally read their own constitution as a
mirror of the Fourth Amendment. See Licciardi, supra note 63, at 1314 & n.43.
65. What makes this situation especially perplexing is that both the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
have clearly approved of plain smell in a case with facts similar to those in Taylor. See
United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming the District Court's
holding that the smell of marijuana gave a government agent probable cause to search a
vehicle). This provides an added layer of dissension between Michigan's state courts and the
federal courts within Michigan's own circuit with regard to the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964) (holding that the same standards for obtaining a warrant
apply to the states as to the federal government).
67. SeeCoolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
68. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373-75 (1993).
69. See United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 956 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Taylor, 564 N.W.2d
at 30; People v. Hilber, 269 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Mich. 1978).
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principal arguments for rejecting a plain smell corollary to plain
view focus on the difficulty in determining the amount of time that
the odor has been present,0 the mobility of odors,7 and the inability
to immediately attribute the odor to an identifiable source. 2 Each
of these arguments suggests that the sense of smell is too unreliable
to support a finding of probable cause.
The sense of smell may be inadequate to create probable cause
because it is difficult to ascertain how long an odor has been
present in the location where it is detected. Several courts and
commentators have focused on the fact that odors can "linger" for
a substantial period of time after the source of the odor is no longer
present.73 Such a lingering effect makes it uncertain whether the
odor that the officer has detected can be attributed to an object that
is physically present. The argument has been raised, therefore, that
"it is not reasonable to infer present use of marijuana, or to conduct
a search for it... absent determination with reasonable accuracy
of the time frame of use in relation to defendant's" current
location.74 Given the difficulty of such a determination, the mere
odor of marijuana should arguably not be sufficient to create
probable cause for a search.
Plain smell, moreover, may not be viable because of the mobility
of odors. In choosing to reject plain smell, one court referred to the
fact that odors can be carried by the wind to a location where the
70. See Brewer v. State, 199 S.E.2d 109, 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973); Hilber, 269 N.W.2d at
164; State v. Schoendaller, 578 P.2d 730, 734 (Mont. 1978); State v. Jones, 1998 WL 515939,
at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1998).
71. See Jones, 1998 WL 515939, at *3; see also Taylor, 564 N.W.2d at 30 (suggesting that
the odor of marijuana could travel in a car that has never contained marijuana).
72. See Taylor, 564 N.W.2d at 30. Additional arguments against plain smell assert that
there is inconsistency among people with regard to the acuteness of their sense of smell, see
Hilber, 269 N.W.2d at 164, that it is not always logical to infer that one who has smoked
marijuana recently now possesses it, see id., and that there is a lack of tangible evidence that
the odor ever existed, see Pace, 709 F. Supp. at 956; Jones, 1998 WL 515939, at *3. Inasmuch
as the latter concern reflects a distrust of taking a police officer at his word, it should be
noted that much of the evidence upon which police base their determinations of probable
cause cannot be produced at trial, such as furtive movements, suspicious behavior, tips of
confidential informants, etc. Moreover, itis patently unworkable to base Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence on the assumption that police officers will lie.
73. See Brewer, 199 S.E.2d at 112; Taylor, 564 N.W.2d at 30; Hilber, 269 N.W.2d at 164;
Schoendaller, 578 P.2d at 734 ("[T]he mere odor of marijuana might linger in an automobile
for more than a day."); Schwartz, supra note 37, at 162.
74. Hilber, 269 N.W.2d at 164.
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source of the odor was never present." Relying on their sense of
smell alone, consequently, "might very easily mislead officers into
fruitless invasions of privacy where there is no contraband."76 The
concern appears to be that an officer will conduct some searches
based on his detection of a suspicious odor that has no actual
connection, past or present, to the place or party being searched.
Thus, the mobility of odors may weigh against the adoption of the
plain smell doctrine.
Another criticism of plain smell is that, unlike plain view or plain
feel, it is virtually impossible to attribute an odor to a precise
location or person without additional evidence. "When an officer
sees or feels contraband, he knows it is present and he can tell who
has possession of that contraband. The same is not true with the
sense of smell."7 The idea is that a search predicated on smell
alone will necessarily be more intrusive than a search that follows
the detection of an item by sight or touch, because the officer does
not know the precise location of the contraband before searching.78
This potential inability to begin the search by focusing immediately
on a particular place or individual creates another argument
against the adoption of a plain smell corollary to plain view.
Why the Case Against Plain Smell is Unconvincing
Although the arguments against plain smell have merit, they all
have weaknesses that weigh against a blanket refusal to allow odor
alone to support a finding of probable cause. The case against plain
75. See Jones, 1998 WL 515939, at *3.
76. Schoendaller, 578 P.2d at 734; see also People v. Marshall, 442 P.2d 665, 670 (Cal.
1968) ("Even a most acute sense of smell might mislead officers into fruitless invasions of
privacy where no contraband is found."), disapproved in Guidi v. Superior Court, 513 P.2d
908 (Cal. 1973) (overruling anyinterpretation of Marshall that created aholding on the issue
of the power of police to seize a bag in plain sight that had previously been described as
containing contraband, based on odor and other evidence).
77. Taylor, 564 N.W.2d at 30; see also Marshall, 442 P.2d at 670 (suggesting that one
problem with plain smell is that the officer must still conduct a search for the item after he
has detected the odor in "plain view").
78. See Marshall, 442 P.2d at 669-70 ("To hold ... that an odor, either alone or with other
evidence of invisible contents can be deemed the same as or corollary to plain view, would
open the door to snooping and rummaging through personal effects."). This maybe especially
problematic in a situation in which more than one person occupies the area to be searched
because the officer cannot readily connect the odor to a specific individual.
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smell is unconvincing for three key reasons. First, with regard to
the determination of whether contraband is present, the sense of
smell is at least as reliable as the sense of touch, which has the
Supreme Court's imprimatur as a corollary to plain view.79 Second,
the fact that odors have the ability to linger and move from one
place to another merely suggests that an officer cannot be one
hundred percent certain that contraband is present." It does not,
however, suggest that an officer cannot reasonably believe from his
detection of an odor that there is a "fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.""' Third,
the inability to immediately link an odor to a particular individual
militates against the determination of probable cause to arrest, but
not against the determination of probable cause to search.
82
The sense of smell is at least as reliable as the sense of touch in
determining whether contraband is present, and should therefore
be accorded equal status to touch within the plain view doctrine.
Use of the sense of touch "does not usually result in the immediate
knowledge of the nature of the item."" With regard to the detection
of certain items of contraband, however, the sense of touch can be
just as reliable as the sense of sight.' Such is the case when
"objects have a distinctive and consistent feel and shape that an
officer has been trained to detect and has previous experience in
detecting .... "85 To put it plainly, the sense of touch is occasionally
79. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
81. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (discussing what is required to find
probable cause).
82. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
83. State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982), overruled by Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (abrogating Broadnax's holding that nonthreatening
contraband could not be seized in a Terry frisk). Like smell, the sense of touch has also been
criticized as too unreliable to create probable cause. See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Plain Feel
Doctrine and the Evolution of the Fourth Amendment, 42 VILL. L. REV. 741, 775 (1997). As
previously noted, however, the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the sense of
touch in creating probable cause. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
84. See United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 955 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
85. Id. By analogy then, the sense of smell would also be reliable in detecting objects that
have a distinctive odor, such as marijuana, when an officer has previous experience or
training in identifying the smell. Some courts have even suggested that the sense ofhearing
may fit into the plain view doctrine, allowing statements overheard without the benefit of
listening devices to be admissible at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046,
1051-52 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d
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as reliable as the sense of sight. The same can certainly be said for
the sense of smell. Although smell will not always be highly
reliable, in some circumstances "smell may actually convey a more
certain indication of crime than sight."86 Smell, therefore, is
analogous to touch in that it is occasionally as reliable as sight.
More importantly, the reliability of the sense of smell will
sometimes exceed that of touch in determining the nature of a
particular object." Thus, given the broad acceptance of plain view
and plain touch, the argument that plain smell should be rejected
because the sense of smell is too unreliable must fail.
The mobility of odors and their ability to linger are also
unconvincing as impediments to the creation of a uniform exception
based on plain smell. The thrust behind these criticisms is that
officers will be misled into conducting searches that do not actually
uncover contraband, thus creating"fruitless invasions of privacy."88
The obvious flaw with this argument is that it demands from police
officers a level of certainty well beyond that required for probable
cause. Probable cause does not mandate that the officer be
absolutely certain that his search will uncover contraband, but
rather requires "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place." 9 Provided the officer has
a reasonable belief that contraband is present, it is irrelevant
1071, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973). Taste has also been
mentioned. See State v. Washington, 396 N.W.2d 156,161-62 (Wis. 1986) ("Evidence in plain
view... includes the realization of items or events to all of the human senses, smell, sight,
touch, hearing and taste."). Compared to sight, smell, and touch, however, the senses of taste
and hearing have received minimal attention in discussions of probable cause to search.
86. Schwartz, supra note 37, at 161 (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 3.6, at 651 (1978)) (emphasis added). Although this may not always be the case, it is easy
to imagine circumstances in which the odor of a substance will be more telling than its
physical appearance. For example, while the odor of marijuana is unique, its physical
appearance could easily be confused with other green leafy substances, such as parsley or
oregano. See Henry Farber, Crime Evidence Technician Maintains 'Chain of Custody'
ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 11, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 3811320.
87. Cf Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 102 (rejecting officer's plain touch finding of probable cause
in part because the feel of the drug lacked the same "distinctive character" as the smell of
marijuana).
88. People v. Marshall, 442 P.2d 665, 670 (Cal. 1968); State v. Schoendaller, 578 P.2d
730, 734 (Mont. 1978).
89. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause,... as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities.").
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whether the search bears fruit.9" In justifying its acceptance of the
plain touch doctrine, moreover, the Supreme Court characterized
the sense of touch as having "sufficient reliability," not absolute
reliability.9 1 It has already been established that the sense of smell
is as reliable as the sense of touch in detecting contraband.92 Thus,
rejecting plain smell based on the fear that it will produce occa-
sional fruitless searches is inconsistent with both the Supreme
Court's acceptance of plain touch and the standard of probable
cause dictated by the Fourth Amendment.
The criticism that plain smell searches will be overly broad
because odors can seldom be immediately attributed to a specific
individual is also untenable, especially when one considers situa-
tions in which officers detect an odor that can be linked only to a
single person.9" Furthermore, even when the officer is confronted
with a 'group of people in the vicinity of the odor, the fact that he
may not be able immediately to ascertain which of those individuals
is linked to the odor is not dispositive of his right to conduct a
search. To draw such a conclusion is to confuse the demands of
probable cause to arrest with those of probable cause to search.
Although the same amount of evidence is required to create
probable cause to search and probable cause to arrest, "[e]ach
requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts
and circumstances-a point which is seldom made explicit in the
appellate cases."94 Whereas probable cause to arrest exists where
an officer has a reasonable belief that some person possesses
contraband,95 probable cause to search exists "if the man of ordinary
90. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
91. See Minnesotav. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993) (emphasis added). Significantly,
the Supreme Court has endorsed plain touch despite criticism that the doctrine results in
searches that uncover nothing illegal. See Poulin, supra note 83, at 759.
92. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
93. An officer detecting the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle with a single
occupant is an example of such a situation.
94. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 3.1(b), at 544; see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 425-33 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (acknowledging the distinction between arrests
and searches with regard to the warrant requirement); State v. Heinz, 480 A.2d 452, 460
(Conn. 1984) (recognizing the distinction between probable cause to search and probable
cause to arrest); State v. Doe, 371 A.2d 167, 169 (N.H. 1975) ("[Plrobable cause to search is
not the same as probable cause to arrest.").
95. See Poulin, supra note 83, at 775.
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caution would be justified in believing that what is sought will be
found in the place to be searched .... "96 Thus, it is perfectly
conceivable that probable cause would exist to search a particular
place although there is no probable cause to arrest any person who
occupies that place. Probable cause to arrest, for example, may
arise only after a search produces incriminating evidence, which
can then be linked to a particular individual. In the common
situation in which an officer detects the odor of marijuana
emanating from a vehicle with multiple occupants, therefore, the
fact that the odor is not immediately attributable to any one of the
occupants is immaterial to the determination of probable cause to
search the vehicle.98 In the plain smell context, consequently, the
argument that odors are not always immediately attributable to a
particular individual may militate against a contemporaneous
finding of probable cause to arrest, but not against a finding of
probable cause to search.
The Case for Plain Smell
There are several compelling arguments in support of plain
smell. First, plain smell is a logical extension of the well-established
plain view doctrine. Second, human olfactory detection of contra-
band cannot logically be distinguished from a trained canine "alert"
on an object or place that contains contraband, which is almost
96. Doe, 371 A.2d at 169 (emphasis added); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 3.1(b), at
545 (indicating that determination of probable cause to search is based on connecting the
items sought with their present location); Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme
Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961) (stating that
the function of probable cause to search "is to guarantee a substantial probability that the
invasions involved in the search will be justified by discovery of offending items").
97. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 3.1(b), at 544.
98. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978) ("The critical element in a
reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there
is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are
located on the property to which entry is sought."); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
158-59 (1925) (asserting that probable cause to search an automobile is not dependent upon
having probable cause to arrest anyone inside, but rather upon having a reasonable "belief
that the contents of the automobile offend against the law"); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12,
§ 3.1(b), at 547 ("[Tlhere can be probable cause to search a vehicle without there also being
probable cause to arrest the owner or operator of that vehicle.").
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universally recognized as giving rise to probable cause to search.9
Finally, certain items of contraband emit odors that are so
distinctive that the mere olfactory detection of them is sufficient to
create probable cause. Hence, the case in favor of plain smell is a
powerful one.
Plain smell is a logical extension of the universally accepted plain
view doctrine. When formulating and developing plain view, the
Supreme Court was careful to leave the door open for the expansion
of the doctrine to include senses other than sight." ° As previously
noted, the Supreme Court has officially recognized the extension of
plain view to include the sense of touch.'1 In so doing, the Court
suggested that there is no constitutional significance in distin-
guishing between probable cause created by touch and probable
cause created by sight.0 2 Moreover, "[a]ny attempt to create a
99. See, e.g., infra note 111 and accompanying text; see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12,
§ 2.2(f), at 366-67 (stating that "an 'alert' by a dog is deemed to constitute probable cause for
an arrest or search.. ."); cf Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (plurality opinion)
(indicating that a positive result of a dog sniff would have given officers probable cause to
arrest the defendant).
100. In first articulating the plain view doctrine, the Supreme Court stated: "Incontro-
vertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on the premises ... may
establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443,468 (1971) (emphasis added). While discussing the plain view doctrine twelve years
later, the Court indicated that an officer may conduct a warrantless search if he is in a lawful
position when he comes to "perceive a suspicious object." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739
(1983). By using the word "perceive" instead of"see," the Court "implicitly acknowledged the
possibility of a future invocation of the doctrine by the use of a sense other than sight." Holtz,
supra note 17, at 525 n.32. Moreover, in his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Stevens
stated that "contraband need not be visible in order for a plain view seizure to be justified."
Brown, 460 U.S. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,375 (1993). The plain touch doctrine is not
an independent exception to the warrant requirement, but rather is simply an extension of
plain view. See Agati, supra note 12, at 942. As a result, the test used to determine whether
touch may give rise to a finding of probable cause is identical to that used for plain view, see
id. at 939; Harvey, supra note 12, at 900, which requires that: (1) the officer must be lawfully
in the position from which he perceives the object, and (2) the objects incriminating nature
must be immediately apparent. See Holtz, supra note 17, at 528; Agati, supra note 12, at 933.
The "immediately apparent" prong does not require certainty by the officer, but rather is
based on probability. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 741-42; Holtz, supra note 17, at 528; Gordon
Van Kessel, Chief Justice Roger Traynor and the United States Supreme Court: Contrasting
Approaches to Search and Seizure, 25 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1324 (1994). Although the test initially
articulated by the Supreme Court included a third requirement of inadvertency, that
requirement has since been eliminated.See Hortonv. California, 496 U.S. 128,136-37 (1990).
102. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76; Harvey, supra note 12, at 903.
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hierarchy of senses under the Fourth Amendment probable cause
standard defies common sense and unjustifiably hinders effective
law enforcement." 0 3 It is clear that the sense of smell is at least as
reliable as the sense oftouchin determining whether contra-band is
present. 104 Furthermore, "Ulust as thereis no reasonable expectation
of privacy in items left in the plain view of an officer..., there can
be no reasonable expectation that plainly noticeable odors will
remain private."0 5 To extend plain view to the sense of touch and
not to the sense of smell, therefore, would be manifestly
unreasonable.
This is not to say that the sense of smell is always as reliable as
the sense of sight, or that plain smell should apply in all instances
in which plain view would apply. Many items of contraband or
evidence of crime are easily identifiable by sight, or even touch, but
not by smell.'0 6 The fact that one sense is less reliable than another
in certain situations, however, is not reason enough to exclude that
sense from the plain view doctrine.0 7 It simply means that other
senses may be used less frequently than sight when establishing
probable cause.'0 3 As such, there is no reason why each extension
of plain view, whether it be for touch, smell, or any other sense,
should not be allowed to operate within its own sphere of reliability.
Along the same vein as the logic behind extending plain view to
include plain smell, finding probable cause based on canine
detection of odors is arguably incompatible with the rejection of
plain smell for humans.'l 9 With regard to a finding of probable
cause, human olfactory detection of contraband cannot logically be
103. Harvey, supra note 12, at 902; see also State v. Washington, 396 N.W.2d 156, 161-62
(Wis. 1986) ("Evidence in plain view is not restricted to items which can only be seen, but
rather includes the realization of items or events to all of the human senses, smell, sight,
touch, hearing and taste."); Harvey, supra note 12, at 903 ("Probable cause is probable cause,
whether based on visual, aural, olfactory, or tactile identification.").
104. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
105. People v. Price, 431 N.E.2d 267, 269 (N.Y. 1981).
106. Perhaps the clearest example would be a gun, or other types of weapons.
107. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376; Agati, supra note 12, at 944.
108. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376.
109. Significantly, the plain smell doctrine is the most common rationale offered to
support the constitutionality of canine sniffsearches. See William M. FitzGerald, Comment,
The Constitutionality of the Canine Sniff Search: From Katz to Dogs, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 57,
69 (1984).
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distinguished from a trained canine "alert" on an object or place
that contains contraband.1 ' Nevertheless, even jurisdictions that
have rejected or failed to adopt plain smell for humans allow for a
finding of probable cause based solely on canine detection of
odors."' Although it is indisputable that the canine sense of smell
is much more acute than that of humans,"2 that simply means that
human smell should be relied on in fewer cases, not that it should
be rendered useless in all instances. The underlying principle is
identical: One who has training or experience in detecting a
particular odor is deemed sufficiently reliable in his detection of
that odor to warrant a finding of probable cause.
If the odor is strong enough for a human to be able to detect it
with his comparatively weak olfactory powers, there is arguably a
stronger showing of probable cause because of the greater likelihood
that contraband is currently present. Whereas a dog may detect a
very faint trace of an odor that indicates only the prior presence
of contraband in the area searched,"' human detection of the odor
will necessarily only occur when the odor is stronger than that
necessary for a canine to alert. In order for the odor to be strong
110. See United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1981) (equating dog's
smelling of an odor with officer's smelling of it); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459,461
(2d Cir. 1975) (equating human and canine detection of odors for Fourth Amendment
purposes).
111. See Roundtree v. State, 446 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that canine
alert provided probable cause to search); Kenner v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1122, 1127 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (basing ultimate determination of probable cause on canine alert, and reserving
"for another day the resolution of whether in Indiana the odor of marijuana standing alone
constitutes probable cause" with regard to human olfactory detection); People v. Clark, 559
N.W.2d 78, 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that canine's alert provided probable cause for
warrantless search of vehicle's trunk); State v. Riley, 624 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993) (finding probable cause to search trunk of car based on canine alert); Alvarez v.
Commonwealth, 485 S.E.2d 646, 650 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (finding probable cause based on
positive canine sniff of defendant's package); Brown v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 877, 881
(Va. Ct. App. 1992) (acknowledging that canine alert on luggage gave police probable cause
to search); Limonja v. Commonwealth, 383 S.E.2d 476, 483 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
probable cause to search based on canine alert on gift-wrapped package).
112. See JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON, DOGS NEVER LIE ABOUT LOVE: REFLECTIONS ON
THE EMOTIONALWORLD OF DOGS 68 (1997) (indicating that a dog's sense of smell is up to 100
million times better than that of a human being).
113. Use of trained dogs to search is not foolproof. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp.
1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affd in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing a situation in
which police dogs experienced a significant percentage of false alerts); FitzGerald,supra note
109, at 87 (highlighting the fact that canine sniff searches are fallible).
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enough to be detected by a human, there will be either a substantial
quantity of contraband in the immediate area or the contraband
will have been exposed to the air fairly recently. It follows, then,
that a human will be less likely than a dog to detect the odor of
contraband when there is none present. The result will be fewer
fruitless searches, which is good for both police, who will spend less
time searching, and law-abiding citizens, who will be subjected to
fewer searches. If a canine alert on an object provides sufficient
probable cause to search, there is no reason that human smell
should not do the same.
In addition, the fact that certain types of contraband emit an odor
so distinctive as to make their source immediately apparent
bolsters the arguments that plain smell is a logical extension of
plain view and that acceptance of canine plain smell is incom-
patible with rejection of human plain smell. Numerous courts
have explicitly acknowledged the distinctive character of the
smell of marijuana. 4 Significantly, police officers are consistently
quoted as referring to the "distinctive" odor of marijuana."5 The
odor is so recognizable, in fact, that acknowledgment of its
uniqueness is not limited to courts and law enforcement personnel,
but also extends to, among others, newspaper reporters, 116
114. See Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 461("It is well understood that marijuana... has an
offensive and pungent aroma."); State v. Raymond, 516 P.2d 58, 61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973);
People v. Reisman, 277 N.E.2d 396, 399 (N.Y. 1971) (characterizing the odor of marijuana
as a"telltale odor"); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982); Court Decisions, N.Y.
L.J. 32 (1997) (reporting on People v. Luis Huertas, an unpublished decision, in which the
court referred to the "distinctive odor of marijuana").
115. See Law & Order, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 7,1997, at 39, available in 1997
WL 12565553; News from Nashville's Neighbors, TENNESSEAN (Nashville), May 25, 1996, at
2B, available in 1996 WL 10354054; Take Drugs Away, Suspect Tells Police, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 19,1991, at B3, available in 1991 WL 4449881 (.eferring to the "unique and distinctive"
odor of marijuana); Adam Weintraub, State DWILaws Address Drugs, ARKANSAS GAZErTrE,
Oct. 2, 1989, at 4A, available in 1989 WL 6910311.
116. See Bill Coats, Marijuana Plants Create a 'Sea of Green' in Home Series, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Oct. 17, 1997, at 6, available in 1997 WL 14071787; Diane
Crowley, "Metalhead" Son Expects Mom to Honor Their Deal, CHI. SUN-TIAIES, May 2,1989,
at 39, available in 1989 WL 5503210; Sockwell Ikimulisa, Police Discuss Drugs, Gangs in
Indianola, DES MOINES REG., Apr. 19, 1996, at 6, available in 1996 WL 6235111 (describing
the "pungent, unique scent of marijuana"); John Painter, Jr., Drug Agents Go Calling, Hit
Marijuana Jackpot, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 1996, at C2, available in 1996 WL
11403485.
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teenagers, 117 elementary and high school principals,1  and retired
secretaries.' The odor is so readily identifiable that it has even
been described as "unmistakable."'2 ° In light of the distinctive odor
of marijuana, it is illogical to assert that an officer who has training
or experience with the odor could not base his finding of probable
cause on his detection of that odor alone. 12' An officer who is
familiar with the odor of marijuana undoubtedly could conclude,
solely from his detection of that odor, that there is "a fair
probability that contra-band or evidence of a crime will be found in
[that] particular place." 22 Because this standard is all that
probable cause demands, the smell of marijuana alone should be
sufficient to allow a finding of probable cause.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING PLAIN SMELL
For some, the notion of extending plain view to include the sense
of smell would signal further "erosion" of the Fourth Amendment
and hence result in more invasions of one's privacy.12 Fears that
117. See Daryl Kelley, Juvenile Drug Charges Have Increased Tenfold Law Enforcement:
Many Teen-agers Are Using Methamphetamine, Which Is Cheaper Than Beer. But Police
Work Is More Effective, L.A. TIMES, June 19,1995, at 1; Port Orchard Police Arrest Husband,
Wife in Pot Bust, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 14, 1999, at B3, available in 1999 WL
6579912.
118. See Timothy Appleby, Pupils SuspendedAfterLunch-time Drug Party, GLOBE&MAIL
(Toronto), Jan. 7, 1999, at A4, available in WL, News Library, Globemail File; Bret Jessee,
Student Accused of Drug Use Says Process Flawed, CHARLESTON GAZETTE AND DAILY MAIL
(W. Va.), Apr. 2, 1996, at 1C, available in 1996 WL 5182850.
119. See Sean Kirst, Average Couple Wows 'Em at Woodstock, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse,
N.Y.), July 26, 1999, at B1, available in 1999 WL 4694382.
120. See Thor Christensen, The Other Ones and the Grateful Faithful are Proving... THE
DEAD DON'T DIE, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 5, 1998, at 1C, available in 1998 WL
13085690; Mary Curtius, Marijuana Movement Pushes FounderAside /California Guru Irks
Medical Cannabis Club, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 4,1998, at 2, available in 1998 WL 3553007;
Dave Howland, Close-Up: 40,000 Mellow Out at Boston Pro-pot Rally, PATRIOT LEDGER
(Quincy, Mass.), Oct. 5, 1998, at 2, available in 1998 WL 8103359; Priya Ramani & Robin
Abreu, Cocaine the Deceptive Glamour Drug is Quickly Becoming the With-it Statement in
Mumbai, INDIA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2085219.
121. In determining whether probable cause exists, a police officer is justified in drawing
inferences based on his past experience. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700
(1996).
122. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
123. See, e.g., George M. Dery III, The Uncertain Reach of the Plain Touch Doctrine: An
Examination of Minnesota v. Dickerson and Its Impact on Current Fourth Amendment Law
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adoption of plain smell will dramatically increase the number of
warrantless searches performed are unfounded. As a preliminary
matter, there are few substances that emit an odor distinctive
enough to justify a finding of probable cause. In addition, even
when odors are distinctive, an officer's detection of those odors
will not always satisfy the standard of probable cause to search.
Furthermore, even in a plain smell jurisdiction, certain places, such
as the home, carry a heightened expectation of privacy that pre-
cludes warrantless searches except in the rarest of cases.'
1
Adoption of plain smell, therefore, does not open the floodgates to
a rash of previously prohibited warrantless searches.
There are only a handful of substances that emit odors dis-
tinctive enough to justify a finding of probable cause. Beyond
marijuana's distinctive odor, the smells of opium and gasoline have
also served to support findings of probable cause. 25 Additionally,
methamphetamine ("speed") and phencyclidine ("PCP") have been
described as having "distinctive" odors, 6 which may indicate that
and Daily Police Practice, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 387-88 (1994) (condemning the extension
of plain view to include the sense of touch as "erosion of the warrant clause"). See generally
Todd Martin Gascon, Casenote, Criminal Procedure: Something Smells in the Fifth Circuit:
The Further Erosion of the Fourth Amendment-United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910 (5th
Cir. 1988), 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 761, 761-74 (1989) (arguing against creating more
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
124. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."); see also infra notes 129-36 and
accompanying text. But see State v. Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621,629 (Wis. 2000) (upholding the
search of a home based on the detection of the odor of marijuana). For a discussion of the
Hughes case, see Dennis Chaptman, Odor of Pot Permits Search, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Mar. 18, 2000, at 1A, available in 2000 WL 3838843.
125. See, e.g., Pong Ying v. United States, 66 F.2d 67, 67-68 (3d Cir. 1933) (holding that
narcotics officer's detection of the odor of burningopiumjustified awarrantless search); State
v. Schubert, 561 A.2d 1186, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that the strong
odor of gasoline emanating from an arson suspeces car created probable cause to search the
vehicle).
126. See John Ward Anderson, Police Arrest 50 in Widespread Drug Sweep in Anacostia,
WASH. POST, Aug. 12,1984, at D7; Nancy Garland, Country Trio Indicted forDealing 'Speed',
BANGOR DAILYNEWS (Bangor, Me.), Nov. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11886260 (stating
that the manufacture ofmethamphetamine produces a "strong, distinctive odor); J. Stryker
Meyer, Nightmare of PCP Passed to Children, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIE., Nov. 20, 1985, at
A12, available in 1985 WL 2829354; Richard Powelson, Wamp Gets House OKon $1 Million
to Fight Illegal Drug Labs, KNOXVILLE NEwS-SENTINEL, Oct. 22, 1999, at A5, available in
1999 WL20031185 (stating that methampetamine emits a"distinctive ether-like odor during
production").
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the detection of those odors by a trained or experienced police
officer could give rise to a finding of probable cause. Alcohol,
although it emits a distinctive odor, is distinguishable from the
aforementioned substances in that it is not ordinarily illegal
contraband. Whereas the odor of marijuana, methamphetamine, or
PCP is immediately attributable to illegal activity, the odor of
alcohol is indicative of illegal activity only in conjunction with other
circumstances, such as an illegally excessive blood alcohol level
while driving or consumption by a minor. Thus, the mere detection
of the odor of alcohol, without other evidence that the subject is
impaired or underage,'27 should not justify a warrantless search of
the area.
In addition to the inherent limitations placed on plain smell by
the small number of substances that emit sufficiently distinctive
odors, there is a heightened expectation of privacy attached to
certain places that will often serve to preclude a warrantless
search.28 Because a legitimate expectation of privacy is essential to
any claim of Fourth Amendment protection,'29 the setting of the
incident is an important consideration in the determination of
whether plain smell justifies a warrantless search.13 0 With regard
to the need for a warrant, the Supreme Court has consistently
drawn a distinction between stores, homes, or other buildings, and
movable items such as vehicles. 13 ' The Court has stated that there
is a "diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the
automobile." 32 In contrast, warrantless searches of a home are
considered presumptively unreasonable. 13 3 Moreover, "no amount
127. In a drunk driving situation, this limitation on plain smell should not hinder effective
law enforcement. Other evidence of impairment, such as slurred speech, reckless or overly
cautious driving, or bloodshot eyes will almost always be apparent to the officer.
128. See supra note 28.
129. See supra note 28.
130. See Schwartz, supra note 37, at 167-68.
131. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
132. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); see also Pennsylvania v. Labron,
518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (stating that the owner of a vehicle has a diminished expectation
of privacy in his automobile).
133. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) (finding that "the monitoring
of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the
Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the
residence").
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of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent
'exigent circumstances.'"'" Although the mobility of vehicles is itself
considered an exigent circumstance that excuses the warrant
requirement, 13 5 no such automatic exigent circumstance is attached
to buildings. 1"6 As a result, warrantless searches of a home or other
building will not be widespread in a plain smell jurisdiction.
It is also important to note that not every situation in which an
officer detects a distinctive odor will give rise to probable cause to
search. As previously stated, probable cause requires that the
information known by the officer be sufficient for him to conclude
that there is "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place."13 Stated another way, it
must be reasonably probable that the officer will find the evidence
for which he is looking.'Although this is admittedly not a stringent
standard for police to meet, it is a necessary threshold nonetheless.
In the plain smell context, several factors will contribute to
whether a police officer is justified in finding probable cause based
on odor alone. First, and most obvious, the officer must be highly
familiar with the odor. Any officer who is not sufficiently familiar
with the odor in question should not be permitted to find probable
cause based solely on his detection of that odor.131 Second, a court
should consider whether more than one officer detected the odor.
Although detection by a single officer who is familiar with the odor
can certainly be sufficient, the fact that multiple officers testify to
the presence of the odor should weigh in favor of finding probable
cause. Third, the relative strength of the odor should be important.
On the one hand, if an officer detected only a faint trace of an odor,
134. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,468 (1971); see also Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 750 (1983) ("Exigent circumstances must be shown before the Constitution will
entrust an individual's privacy to the judgment of a single police officer.").
135. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. The mobility of automobiles makes the warrant
requirement impractical. By the time the officer returned with a search warrant, the
automobile easily could have-left its previous location and moved out of the jurisdiction
where the warrant was obtained. See id.
136. See supra note 28.
137. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
138. The plain view doctrine requires that: (1) the officer must be lawfully in the position
from which he perceives the object, and (2) the object's incriminating nature must be
immediately apparent. See supra note 101. The requirement that the officer be highly
familiar with the odor goes to the "immediately apparent" prong: If an officer is not familiar
with the odor, the odor's incriminating nature cannot be immediately apparent to him.
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and only for a brief moment before losing the scent, it would be
highly suspect for that officer to argue that it was probable that a
search would uncover the substance he smelled. If, on the other
hand, an officer detected a strong odor of contraband, and that odor
remained in the air throughout a substantial portion of the officer's
encounter with the subject, the officer would be justified in
believing it probable that a search would uncover that contraband.
Thus, not every situation in which an officer detects the odor of
contraband will give rise to probable cause to search. Only those
situations in which the officer is familiar with the odor and the odor
is relatively strong should meet the requirements of probable
cause.
39
As a result of these threshold requirements for a finding of
probable cause based on odor alone, there is a potential concern
that adoption of the plain smell doctrine will add significant costs
to the training of police officers. Allowing a finding of probable
cause based on odor alone necessarily assumes that the officer
perceiving the odor is capable of reliably identifying the nature of
the odor's source. One could argue, therefore, that officers in plain
smell jurisdictions must be required to undergo extensive and costly
training in the detection of odors such as that of marijuana. The
need to raise additional tax money in order to expand the training
of police officers may be more than some jurisdictions are willing to
bear.
Such training, however, need not be extensive or costly. The
underlying premise of plain smell is that certain odors are so
distinctive as to make their mere detection sufficient to create
probable cause to search. 4 ' The distinctive nature of odors such as
marijuana makes extensive training unnecessary. One who has
been exposed to the odor of marijuana only a few times, knowing
that the odor he smelled was marijuana, will certainly recognize the
139. The burden of proving these threshold requirements will rest, of course, with the
prosecution should the legality of the search be challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds.
140. See United States v. Rivera, 486 F. Supp. 1025, 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 654 F.2d
1048 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g granted and rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1982);
cf. 1 JoHNWELEYHALL, JR., SEARCHAND SEIZURE § 9:8, at 493 (2d ed. 1991) (indicating that
an odor must be subject to accurate identification to fall within plain smell).
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odor the next time he smells it. 4 ' Thus, only minimal training
would be necessary.
Moreover, the manner in which the officer becomes familiar with
the odor is immaterial. What matters is that the detection of the
odor creates a sufficient level of suspicion in the officer to support
a finding of probable cause. Therefore, if an officer without formal
training in the detection of the odor of marijuana is able to testify
that he is familiar with the odor through other means,142 there is no
reason why his determination of probable cause should be treated
differently than that of an officer with formal raining. Allowing
officers to base their determinations of probable cause on odors with
which they are independently familiar will reduce the costs that
may be necessary to train officers in the detection of odors.
Consequently, the added costs of training police officers in plain
smell jurisdictions should be minimal.
CONCLUSION
The current state of the law with regard to the plain smell
doctrine is unacceptable. Although the lower federal courts have
overwhelmingly endorsed plain smell, the Supreme Court has failed
to do so. States, therefore, are free to accept or reject plain smell as
they please. Most states that have addressed the issue have chosen,
wisely, to adopt plain smell." Many states, however, have either
rejected plain smell or have given contradictory rulings.' The
result is an atmosphere of uncertainty and a lack of uniformity in
the administration of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, both
within states and across state borders.
141. This assertion hardly requires scientific support. Most adults, regardless of whether
they have actually used marijuana, have probably been exposed to its odor at some point in
their lives. For those who have, the odor is readily identifiable.
142. For example, an officer may have been involved in numerous arrests for marijuana
possession and have had the odor identified by other officers.
143. Interestingly, the newest addition to the list, Michigan, was also the state that most
recently rejected plain smell. See People v. Taylor, 564 N.W.2d 24 (Mich. 1997) (applying a
totality of the circumstances approach and holding that odor alone is insufficient to create
probable cause), overruled by People v. Kazmierczak, 605 N.W.2d 667 (Mich. 2000) (stating
that"[pirobable cause can exist when the odor of marijuana is the only factor indicating the
presence of contraband"). By reconsidering their former position and choosing to adopt plain
smell- in Kazmierczak, the Michigan Supreme Court has done exactly what this Note
encourages from all jurisdictions that have failed to recognize plain smell.
144. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
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The arguments against plain smell are specious at best, and are
outweighed by the arguments in favor of plain smell. With no
significant split among the federal circuits, however, Supreme
Court resolution of the issue may never occur. Consequently, it is
incumbent upon those jurisdictions that have failed to make a
conclusive decision about plain smell to weigh the issue for
themselves. After considering all pertinent information, there can
be only one conclusion: Plain smell is a logical and necessary
corollary to the plain view doctrine.
Michael A. Sprow
